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ARGUMENT 
I. Plaintiff Is Not Subject to the Notice Requirements of the Utah 
Government Immunity Act. 
A. Plaintiff's Claims Are Not Statutory in Nature. 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are not contractual because they 
arise from a city's statutory powers. In support of this assertion, Defendants rely 
on Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-815 and the decision of this Court in Knight v. Salt 
Lake County, 2002 UT App 100, 46 P.3d 247. However, the decision in Knight 
arises from an entirely different statutory scheme. 
In Knight, the plaintiffs were specifically employed pursuant to the County 
Personnel Management Act, Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-1, et seq. (1999). Knight, 
at 1J7, n. 6. The Knight court held that any contracts or written personnel policies 
and manuals were specifically required by statute, and so could not give rise to 
an employment contract. Id. at fflf 11-13. Indeed, the County Personnel 
Management Act, which applies only to counties, and has no counterpart in the 
municipal code, provides specific employment guidelines for county employees. 
The act also provides reciprocal protections, which protect the employees and 
obviate the need to allow contractual claims.1 
1For example, Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-10 requires establishment of a 
grievance procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-11.5 requires that counties act in 
compliance with the Utah Labor Code. The act also provides criminal 
punishments for violations. Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-14. 
1 
No such statute or protections was in place to reduce the contractual 
significance of the city's policies in this case. For the city to claim that Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-3-815 is something akin to the County Personnel Management Act, so 
as to make the instant claims statutory rather than contractual is an unreasonable 
stretch of the imagination. Section 10-3-815 states simply, "The governing body 
of each municipality shall prescribe rules and regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the laws of this state, as it deems best for the efficient 
administration, organization, operation, conduct and business of the municipality." 
This statute does not provide any regulation of specific employment practices as 
does the statutory scheme at issue in Knight, nor does it give rise to the 
contractual rights, which Plaintiff claims Defendant violated. Indeed, section 10-
3-815 has no application to the case at bar. 
B. Plaintiffs Claims Sound in Contract. 
Plaintiff's complaint does not make a single reference to any statute as 
basis for its claims. Instead, the complaint clearly implicates a contractual 
dispute. The Complaint makes specific allegations regarding sick leave, 
accounting for hours, and other contract issues. (Br. of Appellant, Exhibit B, ffij 4-
11.) The Complaint also alleges violations of Defendant's written personnel 
policies, which have contractual importance. (Br. of Appellant, Exhibit B, ffl[12-
13,17.) Given the Defendant's violation of its own policies, and unfair treatment 
2 
of Plaintiff, the contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing also comes into 
play, again, a contract claim. Finally, the Complaint seeks remedies of a 
contractual nature,2 i.e., general damages, reinstatement, and costs of court. (Br. 
of Appellant, Exhibit B, Prayer.) 
Accordingly, there is an issue of fact as to whether the provisions of the 
city's policy manual created a contract, for which the notice requirements of the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act are waived. In this case, the city's policy 
manual has not been made part of a record.3 Instead, because no discovery has 
yet commenced, all that is before this Court are the complaint's allegations that 
personnel policies existed, and that Defendant violated its own policies, which is 
insufficient basis to grant a Motion to Dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
Defendant seems to object that Plaintiff did not plead its case with sufficient 
specificity. (See, Br. of Appellee, at p. 15-16.) However, a cause of action based 
defendant claims that Plaintiff request damages based in tort in response 
to interrogatories. However, those answers were provided in response to 
interrogatories in the previous lawsuit, which was removed to federal court, and 
subsequently dismissed. They were not given in conjunction with the instant 
case. Furthermore, even if there were contract and tort damages sought, the 
contract claims should still be allowed to proceed, even if the tort based claims 
are dismissed for failure to comply with statutory notice provisions. See, Koenig 
v. City of South Haven, 597 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Mich. 1999). 
3While the Defendant has attached two portions of city employment policies 
to its appellate brief, as is discussed more fully in Section Part III, infra, these 
exhibits are not part of the trial court's record, and consequently should not be 
considered by this Court on appeal. 
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in contract is not subject to the pleading requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 9. 
Indeed, in the context of a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint 
should be construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, indulging all 
reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs favor. See, Mounteer v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). As such, if the factual 
allegations of the Complaint, standing alone, can be reasonably construed to 
allege claims sounding in contract, it was error for the trial court to grant 
Defendant Layton City's Motion to Dismiss. This is such a case. 
In Utah, the elements of a prima facie for breach of contract are 1) a 
contract, 2) performance by the party seeking recovery, 3) breach of the contract 
by the other party, and 4) damages. See, Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 
20,1[14, 20 P.3d 388. As mentioned previously, Plaintiff clearly implicated the 
existence of a contract by reference to Defendant Layton City's written personnel 
policies and other contractual issues.4 The complaint also references a long 
history of Plaintiff performing under her employment contract with the city. (Br. of 
Appellant, Exh. B, 1J4.) Plaintiff alleges breach of the contract by reference to 
deviations from written city policies, disparate treatment, and a constructive 
termination from employment. (Br. of Appellant, Exh. B, ffl[12-17.) The prayer for 
4Plaintiff's initial brief also demonstrates that written policies of a 
governmental entity may give rise to contract claims. (Br. of Appellant, pp. 13-
15.) 
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relief sets forth an allegation of damages. As such, the Complaint sets forth a 
prima facie case of breach of contract. 
Given that the allegations of Plaintiffs complaint relate to contract issues, 
and that the relief sought is contractual in nature, Plaintiff was not subject to 
government immunity notice requirements under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-5. 
Plaintiff was entitled to forego the notice requirements applicable to tort claims 
and file her claims in state court. The district court's ruling to the contrary was in 
error, and should be reversed. 
II. Defendant Layton City's Defense of Res Judicata Is Not Before This 
Court. 
Defendant Layton City cannot properly raise the defense of res judicata at 
this stage of the proceedings. Under Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c), "In pleading to a 
preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... res judicata ..." Under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 12(h), with limited exceptions, "A party waives all defenses and 
objections not presented either by motion or by answer or reply..." If res judicata 
is not raised in the pleadings, the defense may not be raised at trial or on appeal. 
See, ££,, Merrilees v. Treasurer, State of Vermont, 618 A.2d 1314,1315 (Vt. 
1992). 
In this case, Defendant did not raise the doctrine of res judicata as an 
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affirmative defense in its Motion to Dismiss. In its motion, Defendant relied solely 
on failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity 
Act. Having never raised res judicata before the trial court, Defendant cannot 
raise the issue for the first time before this Court on appeal. Because the 
defense of res judicata was not raised in the Motion to Dismiss, nor at any other 
time in the lower court proceedings, this Court should not consider the issue now. 
In addition, even if the issue of res judicata were properly before this Court, 
Plaintiff's action is not barred. Before the doctrine of res judicata applies, there 
must be a final judgment on the merits. See, Dennis v. Vasquez, 2003 UT App 
168, j[4, 72 P.3d 135. The federal court dismissal of Plaintiffs claim did not result 
in an adjudication on the merits. Plaintiffs claim that the case was dismissed with 
prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41. However, the very exhibits Defendant cites to 
support its defense disproves such an assertion. In their motion and 
memorandum to dismiss the complaint in federal court, while Defendant sought 
dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, no mention of Rule 41 was ever 
made. (See, Br. of Appellee, Exhibit 9.) Likewise, Judge Kimball's order did not 
refer to Rule 41, nor was the case dismissed with prejudice, but merely dismissed 
without specifics. (See, Br. of Appellee, Exhibit 10.) As such, dismissal of the 
case did not result in a final adjudication on the merits, and res judicata does not 
apply. 
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III. Defendant Layton City's Defense of Failure to Exhaust Administrative 
Remedies Lacks Evidentiary Support. 
A. Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Is Not Properly Before 
This Court. 
Defendant Layton City argues that Plaintiff deprived the district court, and 
concomitantly this Court, of subject matter jurisdiction by failing to exhaust 
internal administrative remedies prior to bringing suit. In support of this assertion, 
Defendant attached two excerpts appearing to be from a city personnel policy, 
and argued that they created an absolute requirement for Plaintiff to appeal her 
constructive termination through the city's appeal procedures. No such evidence 
was ever presented to the trial court below, nor was it ever properly introduced 
into the record in this case. 
An appellate court should not consider evidence outside of the record on 
appeal. For example, in Chapman v. Chapman, 728 P.2d 121, 122-23 (Utah 
1986), the Defendants urged the Utah Supreme Court to overturn a summary 
judgment order based on responses to interrogatories and requests for 
admission, which were attached to the appellate brief to support the existence of 
factual issues. The court wrote, "Because these 'answers' are outside the record, 
we cannot consider them." Id. at 123. 
In Cooper v. Foresters Underwriters, Inc., 257 P.2d 540 (Utah 1953), the 
Court was referred to an unsigned stipulation present to the lower court. It wrote: 
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The record in this case is extremely brief, and the facts presented therein 
so fragmentary and incomplete as to make it impossible for this court to 
render a decision without looking dehors the record,-a process we cannot 
indulge.... We cannot consider facts stated in the briefs which may be true 
but absent in the official record. 
These decisions are consistent with other Utah caselaw rejecting consideration of 
evidence outside the record. See, e.g.., Pratt v. Hollow Irrigation Co., 813 P.2d 
1169,1172 (Utah 1991 )(Court would not consider facts alleged in appellate brief, 
which had no substantiation in the record); Watkins v. Simonds, 385 P.2d 154, 
155 (Utah 1963)(Court would not consider facts alleged in appellate brief, where 
facts before trial court were stipulated to in chambers without preservation of a 
record). 
In the appeal before the Court, Defendant Layton City has attempted to 
circumvent its obligation to present evidence and establish any issues for appeal 
through the record. Indeed, it is attempting to create an ad hoc record on appeal, 
without basis for doing so. Given the improper inclusion of the policy manual 
excerpts in the Appellee's Brief, this Court should give the evidence no 
consideration. As such, there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Plaintiff 
should have exhausted administrative remedies, and this defense should not be 
used to uphold an otherwise improper dismissal of Plaintiff's claims. 
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B. Defendant Layton City's Policy Manual Does Not Create an 
Exhaustion Requirement. 
Even assuming arguendo that the policy manual excerpts provided by 
Defendant are properly before this Court, they do not establish exhaustion as a 
prerequisite. First, exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would have 
been futile and useless. In Beard v. Baum, 796 P.2d 1344 (Alaska 1990), the 
State of Alaska alleged that a constructively discharged employee could not sue 
absent exhausting contractual remedies, as is alleged by Defendant Layton City 
in the case at bar. The Beard Court found that because the grievance procedure 
required the cooperation of the plaintiffs supervisors, a constructively discharged 
employee could not be required to exhaust such remedies, as such an attempt 
would have been futile. Id. at 1349. Similarly, in Utah, exhaustion of 
administrative remedies may be excused when it would serve no useful purpose. 
See, Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f l 4 , 34 P.3d 180. 
In this matter, Plaintiffs constructive discharge was the result of coercive 
threats by supervisors who would have had extensive influence over any 
contractual city appellate procedures. Under that policy, the very supervisors 
who coerced Plaintiff into resigning bore the responsibility of advising Plaintiff of 
her appeal rights. (Br. of Appellee, Exh. 13, p.1.) No evidence suggests 
Plaintiffs supervisors so advised her. Furthermore, those same supervisors who 
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forced Plaintiff into resigning would no doubt exert significant influence over the 
internal appellate procedure. Given these facts, requiring Plaintiff to exhaust 
these local contractual remedies would be futile, and would serve no useful 
purpose. 
Furthermore, failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not deprive 
the courts of subject matter jurisdiction, when resort to the administrative 
remedies is not mandatory. In Heinecke v. Dep't. of Commerce, 810 P.2d 459 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Respondent claimed that the court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The 
Petitioner did not take an extra review step, which was permitted him, but not 
required, under the statute. The Heinecke court concluded that because the 
administrative remedy was not mandatory, failure to exhaust did not deprive the 
court of subject matter jurisdiction. 
In the instant case, even though Defendant may have statutory authority to 
create rules and regulations, Defendant's rules do not make appeal with city 
appellate processes mandatory. Defendant's policy states, "In all cases where an 
appointive officer or regular full time employee, other than the City Manager and 
heads of departments, is discharged or transferred to a position with less 
remuneration for any reason, the officer or regular full-time employee shall have 
the right to appeal such discharge or transfer in accordance with this chapter." 
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(Br. of Appellee, Exh. 13, p.2.)(Emphasis added.) Defendant's policy does not 
state that the employee "shall" appeal the discharge, or that the employee "must" 
appeal the discharge prior to taking legal action. Instead, Defendant's policy 
makes an internal appeal an option, stating the "employee shall have the right to 
appeal" the termination. Because use of Defendant's appellate procedure was 
not mandatory under their own policies, Defendant cannot now complain that this 
Court and the trial court lack subject matter jurisdiction over the case at bar. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs complaint in this matter did not arise from any rights derived in 
state statute, nor was it based in any statutory scheme, as Defendant Layton City 
alleges. Plaintiffs complaint sets forth allegations establishing a prima facie case 
of breach of contract. Because claims sounding in contract are not subject to the 
notice requirements of the Utah Government Immunity Act, the district court's 
arbitrary dismissal of this matter was error. Furthermore, Defendant has waived 
the defense of res judicata, and Defendant's exhaustion defense is unsupported 
by the record or in law. As such, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the district court's dismissal of her contract claims. 
11 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Brad 
Benjamin C Rasmussen 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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